EXHIBIT A

THE COURT: We're not going to table the issue.

We had discussed actually potentially tabling this issue, but

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our position is --

MR. SIEGAL: I have committed to not be the attorney cross-examining the investigator they have identified in their letter. We also, I think, are in agreement with the government that any references to my firm or me in the document they intend to offer will be redacted. Beyond that, the relief the government seeks, we will be opposing. We have no objection to a Curcio --

THE COURT: What is the relief beyond that?

MR. SIEGAL: The government --

THE COURT: The only other thing I remember is that you can't get involved in openings and closings.

MR. SIEGAL: Yes, your Honor, that is the extent to which we would object. Obviously, I would not -- to the extent I was doing argument to the jury, I would not be speaking in a voice that would suggest I have any personal knowledge of the events or the facts. To the extent I would be arguing to the jury, it would be based on testimony in the record, and that's it. And we don't think that the law supports the notion of precluding my availability to argue. And none of the cases cited by the government support that position. They said we can submit --

THE COURT: Mr. Fergenson.

MR. FERGENSON: Yes, Judge. That doesn't cure the problem. The law bars an attorney from acting as an unsworn witness during cross-examinations and also during jury

MR. SIEGAL: I'm not cross-examining that witness,

THE COURT: So all the relief the government wants is

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your Honor.

DEFENDANT JAVICE: I understand. Thank you, your Honor. I would like to proceed with Mr. Siegal.

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THE COURT: With Mr. Siegal as your counsel, under the

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What is it, Mr. Fergenson, that you are not getting that you want?

MR. FERGENSON: Your Honor, AUSA Chiuchiolo is going to address this motion.

THE COURT: What is it, Mr. Chiuchiolo, that you're wanting and not getting?

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: Your Honor, I'll start with Rule 16 and Rule 17 issues. The government has received no Rule 16 materials from the defense. We received for the first time shortly before we made our motion a small production from Mr. Amar of materials that the government had actually provided. And it appears in Mr. Amar's response that their view is "we'll give you stuff if we decide we're going to use them." And that really flies in the face of the rule and the mutual exchange that's supposed to happen.

And so we don't really know what they have that they might use, but we do know that Mr. Amar has issued several Rule 17 subpoenas. We have two of them, and the two we have are clearly improper on their face. They seek -- one is to the SEC, and one is to the FDIC, and they basically seek any records in the agency's possession that could reflect --

THE COURT: Let's do Rule 16 first.

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: There's an interplay, your Honor, because if they're planning to use Rule 17 subpoenas for purposes of --

THE COURT: When you say the subpoenas are not -- are not lawful subpoenas, that means the SEC and the FDIC have the opportunity to come in and move to quash.

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: I think the case law on that, your Honor, if the impropriety of a subpoena is before the Court, and we have these two subpoenas, the Court can and should rule on that. It's *United States v. Weissman*. And these two subpoenas which I can hand up to the Court, I mean, I -- in Mr. Amar's letter, they essentially concede as much. I think they offer to perhaps change the return date on the subpoenas, but I don't think that they are defensible on their face. But it raises the issue, your Honor, of what other subpoenas are out there that could also be improper.

We are not -- all we're asking is to just give us the subpoena returns, which is often what happens in most cases. Give us the subpoena returns so there's not unfair surprise, and we don't have delay during trial to try to figure this out. We're only two weeks before trial. It seems like a pretty reasonable request.

THE COURT: All right. Who's going to respond?

MR. BUCKLEY: Your Honor, Sean Buckley on behalf of

Mr. Amar. I'm still unclear as to the exact relief that it is

that the government is seeking. But let me just address the

subpoena issue in turn. With respect to the large subpoena

returns that have been received, they have been from JP Morgan

government. So there is no issue with respect to those Rule 17 subpoenas that --

THE COURT: They're not interested in the subpoenas which you have produced. They're interested in the subpoenas you haven't produced.

MR. BUCKLEY: With regard to the subpoena that they identified that was issued to Zoom, I can represent to the Court that we do not intend to use any materials from Zoom in our case-in-chief nor do we intend to use those materials to impeach any witness. Beyond that, they are not entitled to those materials. We have complied with Rule 16.

THE COURT: Have you received production from the SEC?

MR. BUCKLEY: We have not yet, your Honor. The SEC

requested that we extend its deadline to respond to the

subpoena by one week by virtue of today's conference. I'm

happy to address, if the Court would like to hear, the

propriety of that subpoena because we disagree --

THE COURT: What about the subpoena to the FDIC?

MR. BUCKLEY: The subpoena to the FDIC, after some

back and forth with various agencies within the FDIC was

successfully served, I believe, two days ago. So its return

has not yet been received. And these are materials, Judge,

that relate to interviews conducted by the U.S. Attorney's

Office.

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: Yes. And it does seem from Mr. Amar's response that they're sort of taking a hypertechnical meaning of the Rule's statement.

THE COURT: How so?

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: Well, I think they cite to the definition of statement such as it has to be substantially verbatim, contemporaneously recorded. That's the same definition of statement that's used in Section 3500. And obviously the government would never come in here and say, well, we're not going to produce any notes because they weren't "you know, substantially verbatim."

Rule 26.2 is designed to place the disclosure of prior defense witness statements on the same legal footing as the disclosure of prior government witness statements. So we're just asking -- all we're asking here is for reciprocal exchange of witness statements. The defense has noticed a lot of witnesses - 27 witnesses. We understand a lot of them are not -- the defense might not have access to them and so that's --

THE COURT: We're talking about -- let's make it specific. We're talking about attorneys' notes taken in interviewing or paralegal notes taken in interviewing potential witnesses for trial.

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: Exactly, your Honor. That's the heart of it, including experts.

report and give the same scope of report to the government as

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the government gave to you.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, your Honor. And we have, to be clear, provided the required notice under 16(b)(1)(C) of the anticipated expert testimony that has been signed by each witness in compliance with Rule 16.

The government recently has moved in limine raising various issues but has not complained about the adequacy of that disclosure. Our position is Rule 26.2 for that very reason should not apply to expert witnesses because we have complied with our disclosure obligations under 16(b)(1)(C), and, therefore, they are not entitled to attorney work product or work product prepared by paralegals in our office at our direction in the course of meetings or interviews with potential testifying witnesses. Rule 26.2 just is not triggered here, Judge.

MR. CHIUCHIOLO: Your Honor, if I can respond?

THE COURT: One minute.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I think we're contesting 26.2(f)(1). A written statement that a witness makes and signs, that defendants have agreed to be produced if they haven't already produced it. And the next part is: Or otherwise adopts or approves. If notes are shown to the defendant, those are adopted or approved. If they're not shown, if they're just the paralegal's or attorney's, they don't fit into a written statement.

THE COURT: I've read the note, and it supports the government's proposition. It cites the Supreme Court case of United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) which involved the notes of an interviewer. Without reference to it, it having been adopted or approved by the witness who was interviewed. The government demanded production at the time that production is required under the Jencks Act, that is after cross-examination, and when the defendant refused to produce, the trial court struck the testimony of the witness, and the Supreme Court upheld it.

Now, under the practice of this Court, followed as long as I've been a judge, which is 26 years, the government produces under the Jencks Act not only statements signed or approved or adopted by the witness, but all notes of an interviewer of a witness and of the court procedures that order production is accelerated to before the trial.

Under the Advisory Committee note explaining the rule, the same should apply here because, as is said by the Advisory Committee, I quote: "The rule, with minor exceptions, makes the procedure identical for both prosecution and defense witnesses, including the provision directing the court, whenever a claim is made that the disclosure would be improper because the statement contains irrelevant matter, to examine the statements in camera and excise such matter as should not be disclosed," which I will do.

shown to the witness, okay?

understanding, we haven't made a motion.

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THE COURT: That kind of thing is an instruction to the jury.

What's the position of the defendant, Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: That a limiting instruction is insufficient and will not cure the constitutional defect that exists. So our position is based on the limited information that we have, even that limited information that Ms. Javice is unable to receive a fair trial. There are a couple cases in the district courts of New York that are apposite for this issue. The Shkreli case, the Nordlicht case, which we cited nour brief, and based on the limited information we have, our position is that the problem is of constitutional dimensions.

Now, Mr. Amar's lawyers have indicated that they have additional information to the information that they provided, additional evidence and potentially additional testimony. We don't know what that is, but these very experienced lawyers from this district, many whom are former prosecutors, have used the word antagonistic. That word has meaning, as your Honor knows.

THE COURT: Who said that?

MR. SULLIVAN: Mr. Amar's counsel.

THE COURT: Who said antagonistic?

MR. SULLIVAN: Antagonistic to our defense. And they've also indicated that they're prepared to make a declaration.

I will also just point out -- we learned this on

January 8, your Honor. And by January 10, we wrote your Honor

as soon as it was brought to our attention that the defense was

going to be antagonistic. And based on what we've seen, it is

of an order of magnitude that it is sufficiently severe that a

limiting instruction cannot cure it.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what is meant by antagonistic, and there is nothing in the record now that shows any antagonism.

The allegation is that the defendants participated in the same transaction or series of transactions constituting the offense alleged in the superseding indictment. That means there is joinder that is permissible and in fact desirable because the acts are unified by some substantial identity of facts or participants or arise out of a common plan or scheme. And that's held by the Second Circuit in *United States v.*Feyrer, 333 F.3d 110.

The presumption is strong that severance should be denied. A defendant who seeks separate trials carries a heavy burden of showing that joinder will result in substantial prejudice, and that prejudice must be sufficiently severe to outweigh the judicial economy that will be realized by avoiding lengthy multiple trials.

This trial is a complicated trial. It promises to be a complicated trial. It will take weeks of the Court's and a

jury's time, and it would just be unnecessarily duplicative and
useless to have two trials where there can be one. Limiting
instructions are available to make sure that the jury
understands that the guilt of each defendant must be judged
separately. I will give those instructions, and I will be glad
to get the help of the parties in drafting those instructions.

MR. SULLIVAN: May I be heard briefly, your Honor, just on one last thing?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SULLIVAN: So I would certainly encourage the Court to at least consider in camera, as Mr. Amar's lawyers have volunteered to do, the nature of the antagonistic defense because one of the other aspects of the balancing test that your Honor rightly articulated is, is the trial itself going to be disrupted by constant objections, constant sidebars, objections to the openings.

Right now we have no idea what they're going to say.

And certainly if there is something objectionable, I have an ethical duty to stand up and object. I don't like to object during openings, obviously, and as a practice don't, but must if something comes out that we have not had time to test or vet. So there are a series of motions in limine that --

THE COURT: I will say this: I don't mind objections. It's my job to rule on objections. If something in an opening or a closing is objectionable, I want you to object. So I have

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I am willing to share a written declaration or to tell you verbally. I want to be clear, particularly given what the government just said before I do. We don't want the government or Ms. Javice's counsel to hear the details of our defense. We think that that would be prejudicial. We want your Honor to hear it so that you can make a determination about whether a severance is appropriate. But we would ideally like to share this information with your Honor on the understanding that the Court will keep it under seal and in camera until the trial starts.

THE COURT: This is under seal. I decline to give any

kinds of representations because it would compromise my ability to be a judge. You're going to have to trust me. And if you don't, it's up to you.

MR. COGAN: Understood, your Honor.

Then maybe what I can do is I can start with some information, and you'll tell me to what extent you need to hear more information.

I think what I can say is that we expect to argue at trial, and to elicit evidence at trial, showing that Ms. Javice misled not only the alleged victims in this case, the two banks, but also Mr. Amar, about a number of different representations that were being made to the banks about the company that they were in the process of selling, and also about the reason she was asking him to do certain things.

And so at a high level, as your Honor probably appreciates, what the government is contending in this case is that Ms. Javice tricked JP Morgan, another bank, an investment adviser that was advising Frank, their company, and various other sophisticated people, including Frank's general counsel, and various other very sophisticated people about fundamental information about Frank's business. That's the government's case.

Our defense is that she deceived us as well, and we plan on both eliciting evidence to that effect and also arguing to the jury that for the same reason the government is saying

that they should convict her for having deceived all of those people, they should find that she deceived us as well; that we are essentially a pawn in this and a victim ourselves, not a co-accomplice.

THE COURT: The material proposition is not whether she deceived you. The material proposition is whether you knowingly deceived the government. So the issue is Mr. Amar's knowledge. You will be able to elicit testimony of what Ms. Javice said, but the conclusion whether they were deceptive or not will be the jury's. And it does not necessarily touch upon Mr. Amar's knowledge. So the government is going to have to prove what Amar said or did or joined and that it was knowing. I don't see that it rises to a point of obstruction or interference of either side's defense. It is not sufficient to prevent a jury trial.

MR. BUCKLEY: Your Honor, if I may, one additional point, and we fully appreciate everything the Court just said, but --

THE COURT: I want to tell you this: This does not preclude your ability at the time you exercise it to decide whether or not Mr. Amar should testify. Nothing you say here is going to restrict you in any way.

MR. COGAN: Thank you.

MR. BUCKLEY: Thank you, Judge. One additional concern we have that goes to part of what your Honor just said

is we expect the government is going to seek a conscious
avoidance charge here of willful blindness and argue that one
of the ways that the jury should convict Mr. Amar is that he
willfully blinded himself to various red flags, and they're
going to point to various statements, we expect, by Ms. Javice
and say those constituted red flags that Mr. Amar consciously
avoided, and therefore you can infer that he knew of the fraud.

We are going to contend that he was not aware of those red flags in part because of Ms. Javice's deception.

THE COURT: So the very statements that the government is going to use to prove that you were consciously avoiding knowledge is statements that you're going to use that you were misled. I don't see that as rising to the point where I have to have a separate trial.

MR. BUCKLEY: Understood, Judge, but just --

THE COURT: I am fully advised.

MR. BUCKLEY: Okay. If I could just have one moment. The only other point is not just with regard to Ms. Javice's statements, but we expect to elicit testimony from certain of the government's witnesses that they too were misled, similarly in the manner that our client was, by Ms. Javice.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if that's going to be relevant or not and I can't say now. But this is not stuff that requires me to sever, and I'm not going to.

Okay. Let's go out.

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substantial prejudice that warrants a severance and one that does not seems to be whether the circumstances are beyond co-defendants merely finger-pointing. If it's that, then the

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presumption that your Honor noted of joinder should be recognized.

However, if it's beyond that, and we are in a position where Ms. Javice -- where there is a realistic scenario where Ms. Javice will not only be prosecuted by the government but prosecuted by Mr. Amar, and she thus becomes prejudiced on two fronts, having to respond to the government and Mr. Amar.

At least we know what the government is going to say. We have no idea what Mr. Amar is going to say. So this prejudice is compounded in the sense that a jury gets to hear functionally the government's claim against Ms. Javice twice:

Once from the government and once from Mr. Amar.

If it's on that side of the doctrinal line, it's considered reasonably cognizable prejudice. Your Honor in camera and here has made his ruling, I understand that. I certainly just wanted to make a record that normally in the cases where there is severance, where severance is granted, the moving party has an opportunity to make an argument as to what side of the doctrinal line the proffer falls on.

So we certainly would be making -- we'll be making an application to unseal for Ms. Javice's team the transcript of your Honor's hearing; otherwise, I don't think we're able to make an adequate record. That's point one.

Point two, the Court's ruling is now, I think, compounded by another data point we will advise the Court on.

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We are not ready to argue this yet just because we don't have all the details, but the short is that we learned just last night that the government produced 9,500 additional documents that we've never seen before, and apparently from Mr. Amar's Google drive. This seems emblematic of this larger issue of --I'm going to have difficulty even knowing what to say in opening if everything is sort of trial by ambush. And here I'm not making a normative claim against anybody; I am simply making a claim about the way it is received.

One of the benefits of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is that there is no trial by ambush. We know what the evidence is against us; and if there is adverse evidence, even if it doesn't rise to the level of legally cognizable prejudicial evidence from Mr. Amar, it seems to me that we have some due process rights to know what that evidence is so that we can construct a defense.

So that's the record that I wanted to make.

THE COURT: What remedy do you seek?

MR. SULLIVAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: What remedy do you seek?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, the Court has denied the remedy The remedy we seek is severance generally. Short of we seek. that, we --

THE COURT: That won't change with the 3,600 documents or whatever the number was.

make an adequate record as to -- as to, the way I will put it what side of the doctrinal line those representations fall on.

THE COURT: I deny that.

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MR. SULLIVAN: And brief indulgence.

However, after the close of the case, THE COURT: please renew the motion, and I'll entertain it again.

MR. SULLIVAN: Very well, your Honor.

Depending on the nature of these documents -- and I'm just flagging this, we might seek an adjournment. This is premature at this point. I haven't seen any of them, but we do know that at least 9,500 of them are brand new. So I just don't know the salience yet, but we may have an application before your Honor very shortly.

MR. BUCKLEY: And, Judge, this is Mr. Buckley on

the record that we think are necessary to be answered in order

to inform the nature of the relief that would be sought, and --

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THE COURT: Let's get the government's explanation,

CasyQj23*@r-00251-AKH Document 382-1 Filed 04/25/25 Page 38 of 53 What the government realized two days ago that there 1 had been files that the government had tagged as responsive to 2 3 the search warrant that hadn't been produced to, you know, jointly to both defendants, meaning, your Honor, there are some 4 5 of the 13,000 that were produced yesterday that hadn't been produced to Amar, and there's some, you know, that were in 6 7 Javice's account and vice versa. THE COURT: How can you distinguish what to give whom 8 9 in a joint trial? 10 MR. FERGENSON: This was -- this is the government's 11 standard practice when it gets an account like this, Judge. We give the full account to the person that was using the account. 12 13 It's a terrible procedure. THE COURT: 14 MR. FERGENSON: Fair enough, your Honor. And look, we made a mistake and not --15 16 THE COURT: It's a terrible procedure. Everyone has 17 to be on equal plane. It's not right that the government holds 18 information that will drip out to each particular defendant. 19 If it's required to be produced, it's required to be produced 20 in a trial. MR. FERGENSON: And we realized that it had not been 21

produced to both, your Honor, and we produced them yesterday.

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THE COURT: What do you think I should do now?

MR. FERGENSON: I am not sure there is much to do, your Honor, because we're not seeking -- these were

you received by subpoena to others.

MR. FERGENSON: Well, this was a search warrant, your 1 Honor, and that is what I think makes it a little different. 2 3 You know, we don't actually have the authority --THE COURT: What's the definition of the scope of a 4 search warrant? What documents can you legitimately ask for? 5 MR. FERGENSON: It was -- I don't have the search 6 7 warrant in front of me, your Honor, but it was a warrant to 8 these -- to Google --9 THE COURT: Only if the artifacts of a crime were 10 evidence of it, right? 11 MR. FERGENSON: That's correct your Honor. THE COURT: And almost by definition, if this is a 12 13 crime that authorized the search warrant, every document is 14 relevant. 15 MR. FERGENSON: That was not the way we conducted the 16 review, your Honor. THE COURT: You told me that. I am not criticizing 17 18 you for that. 19 MR. FERGENSON: Fair enough, your Honor. 20 I do want to make clear, your Honor, that the 21 documents we produced yesterday, we were not, we are not 22 seeking --23 THE COURT: I read in the paper today about the

sloppiness of the government in producing in the Menendez trial

documents that should not have been produced to the jury. And

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drives. And so it is very unclear how there is an additional

set of responsive documents that's more than 13,000 documents

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gets a pack of documents, and because it didn't notice at the first instance that it made a full production for whatever reason, and then looks at it again at a later time and decides it needs to make more production, that doesn't mean you need a

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So I just wanted the Court to be aware that it isn't

defense. On behalf of Mr. Amar, we would propose March 3, so a

DEPUTY CLERK: Mmm-hmm.

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THE COURT: In 23B. That's the ruling. We will keep the final pretrial conference on February 4.

MS. PERDOMO: Your Honor, may I make a statement for the record?

THE COURT: You already did. You can do it again.

MS. PERDOMO: Thank you, your Honor. Just for the sake of clarity, there are, as the government has represented to defendants, 13,271 total new files produced. 9,559 of those Ms. Javice has never before reviewed, which is why the Javice team was saying 10,000. Those are the documents Ms. Javice has never seen before.

And with respect to the government's representations of duplicates, that is not a representation that the defense team has very high faith in given the changing numbers over the last 24 hours in our conversations with the government and given the very intricate nature of these documents which come from a drive where the defendants did all of their work at Frank.

For instance, they would edit a spreadsheet. If one little thing changed from one document to another, that would be considered a new document, and I don't know that the government is able to certify that those two documents are not duplicates. The de-duplication would be something we would need to undertake on our own as defendants because of the complicated nature of these documents.